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The National Audit Office should not be responsible for the
audit of local authorities
George Jones and John Stewart support the government’s proposal that local
authorities can choose their own auditor as it is consistent with both localism and practice
in many organisations.
Elective audit  and district audit
The Municipal Corporations Act 1835 prescribed auditors and auditing f or the
boroughs it was creating as the f oundation f or elected local government in urban
areas. The Act provided f or two elective auditors chosen each year by the local-
government electorate and one appointed by the mayor f rom the council members. There was no
provision f or prof essional audit or auditors; auditing was to be carried out by laymen.
Prof essional auditing was introduced at the local level by the Poor Law Acts of  1834 and 1844, which
provided f or prof essional auditors to be appointed nationally to audit the accounts of  local poor- law
authorit ies. On this f oundation district audit gained local government’s respect f or its expertise and
experience.
There was a clear distinction between lay auditors in the municipal boroughs and prof essional audit f or
the poor law, and increasingly f or other authorit ies like the separately-elected school boards (1870),
county councils (1888), district councils (1894) and metropolitan boroughs (1899). When education
became a f unction of  local authorit ies in 1902, district audit continued to audit the education accounts of
the municipal boroughs while lay audit was retained as their main f orm of  audit until 1933, although a
number of  these boroughs took powers under local acts to replace elective audit with district audit or
other prof essionals. The 1933 Local Government Act gave councils the choice between elective audit,
district audit and other prof essional audit.
Elective audit had been much crit icised by prof essionals, by judges and by academics as ineﬃcient and
ineﬀective but had shown great resilience having remained the main f orm of  local audit in most municipal
boroughs f or almost one hundred years. It was still used by 21 authorit ies when nally abolished by the
Local Government Act 1972.
While the case f or prof essional audit is now accepted as the basis of  audit f or nancial practice, probity
and legality, elective audit recognised there was more to audit than the application of  prof essional
standards. It suﬀered f rom uncertainty about its role and duties, and f rom low turnout since its elections
were held separately. Elective auditors could have f ound a role as the voice of  the public on the audit
committees of  local authorit ies, although that role can be played by elected councillors. The need f or
recognition of  lay judgment in the role of  audit is relevant when considering the establishment of  the
Audit Commission.
The Layeld Report and the Audit Commission
The Local Government Finance Act 1982 set up the Audit Commission. The Layeld committee (of  which
we were members) recommended a role beyond tradit ional prof essional audit. Its report, Local
Government Finance, recommended:
• the audit service in England and Wales should be made completely independent of  both the government
and local authorit ies
• the head of  audit should make regular reports on issues of  general interest or public concern relating
to more than one authority. These reports should be available to the public. They should be concerned
particularly with comparisons between the methods employed by local authorit ies and the results
achieved
In describing other reviews that could be pursued by the Audit Commission in its wider role the Layeld
committee said “special staﬀ” might be required  recognising the diﬀerent experiences required beyond
prof essional audit.
The Audit Commission was appointed with a strong role, independent not merely of  local government but
of  central government. It impressed local government with its readiness to crit icise central government.
Its 1984 report on block grant was headlined by The Times as “Watchdog bites owner” f or its devastating
crit ique of  government policy on local-government nance.
The Fateful decision
In the 1990s the Audit Commission took a f atef ul decision to undertake Best Value inspection on behalf
of  the government. This decision turned the Audit Commission in eﬀect into an agent of  central
government. In his authorised history of  the organisation, Follow the Money, Duncan Campbell-Smith
described the long discussions among both Commission members and staﬀ. He quotes Helena
Shovelton, the f uture chair, as telling Commission members “Look f olks, if  we don’t do Best Value
[inspection], there won’t be an Audit Commission”, portraying a bleak f uture as its f unctions were given
to other bodies.
The Commission’s decision to accept the role of  Best Value inspection on behalf  of  central government
marked the end of  its independence, which was conrmed as f urther tasks required by central
government were placed on the Commission: inspecting local authorit ies’ perf ormance, judging and
scoring them. These inspections became the basis on which central government judged local authorit ies,
relying on the Commission’s improbable assumption of  inspectoral inf allibility rather than on the
judgment of  councillors as the elected representatives of  voters whose experience ranged f ar beyond
the short t ime spent by inspectors in the locality. There were no more reports displaying the
independence of  the report on block grant. In the end the outcome was the government’s proposal to
abolish the Commission.
The danger of a Public Accounts Committee intervention in local government
The primary accountability of  local authorit ies must be to their electorate who choose and can remove
the councillors who constitute the council as the authority’s governing body. There is a danger of  central
government and the House of  Commons insisting there must be accountability to them f or the use of
grant by local government.
This approach is shown by the 2011 report, Accountability: Adapting to decentralisation , by Sir Bob
Kerslake, permanent secretary at the Department f or communities and local government. Many in local
government thought this report would be concerned with how accountability could be ensured f or
expenditure by the growing number of  community groups, local appointed bodies and contractors in the
government of  local areas.
Their accountability was f ar f rom clear, whereas local authorit ies have clear accountability to their
electorate and well-established procedures f or ensuring probity. The Kerslake report took what at rst
sight seems a sensible and realistic approach that central government and Parliament should ensure
there were adequate processes f or accountability rather than that all local bodies should be directly
accountable to central government. The report proposed that central government departments should
prepare accountability system statements setting out procedures to ensure the accountability of  such
bodies and of  local authorit ies.
The arguments used to support the case f or this approach show that what is proposed is f ar more
intrusive than might be thought, opening the door f or wide-ranging concern by both central government
and Parliament with how local authorit ies are run. The report sets out what permanent secretaries as
accounting oﬃcers should be concerned about in reporting to Parliament through the Commons public
accounts committee (PAC). “It is not suﬃcient f or there to be a robust system in place to ensure
regularity and propriety and to secure value f or money. Accounting Oﬃcers must also be able [to]
demonstrate to Parliament that it works in practice”. Accounting oﬃcers would then be reporting to
Parliament, presumably through the PAC on the perf ormance of  local authorit ies, which will inevitably
involve consideration of  their way of  working. This approach could lead to the PAC, presumably advised
by the National Audit Oﬃce, extending its remit to cover the working of  local authorit ies, claiming that
accountability to Parliament is essential f or the use of  national resources given through grants to local
government. The result would be to conf use the accountability of  local authorit ies, undermining rather
than sustaining their accountability to their local electorate.
Conclusions
The past experience of  elective auditors as the main basis of  auditing in municipal audit f or nearly one
hundred years raises the issue of  what are the respective roles of  prof essional judgment and lay
judgment in the audit of  local authorit ies. While prof essional audit has a proper role in certif ying local
authority nancial accounts as a true record and in ensuring probity and legality, once auditing extends
beyond those tasks to encompass value f or money and perf ormance, these issues should be f or lay
judgment rather than f or prof essional auditors. That judgment is properly exercised by councillors on
behalf  of  the electorate they represent.
Although the past experience of  elective auditors reected the importance of  lay judgment, we would not
propose their re- introduction. A return to elective auditors would challenge the representative role of
councillors, causing conf usion as to who represented the electorate. There is, however, a question of
whether there should be lay representatives on the audit committees f ound in an increasing number of
authorit ies but with outside appointments of ten restricted to prof essionals or representatives of
outside interests. If  lay representatives were sought, then how should that be achieved: by election, by
ballot as in ancient Athens or by representatives of  community groups? It may be an insoluble but also
an unnecessary problem. The proper source of  lay judgment lies with councillors as elected
representatives whose role should be strengthened.
The government proposes that local authorit ies should choose their own auditors. We support this
proposal as consistent with both localism and practice in many organisations. We would oppose any
suggestion that the National Audit Oﬃce should be responsible f or the audit of  local authorit ies. This
role would be a constitutional outrage and produce a prof essional monopoly to which the government is
rightly opposed. If  there are to be diﬀerent types of  auditors, then councils should be able to choose
their own, including district audit. Over the years district audit has developed important experience in
practice, which should be maintained as a mutual organisation rather than merged with private-sector
rms or national bodies. This approach is all the more desirable because what is likely to emerge f rom
decentralisation to markets will mean the big f our or ve with only limited commitment to the values of
local government.
Special studies drawing on the experience of  local authorit ies should continue to be undertaken, but
under the responsibility of  local government through its collective bodies. Past experience has shown
that the “independence” of  the Audit Commission was not sustainable against central-government
pressures. There are also dangers f or local government in extending the role of  the National Audit Oﬃce
and the PAC into the accountability of  local authorit ies, undermining their primary accountability to their
local electorates, which collective local-government responsibility could sustain.
Past experience has lessons f or the present and f uture, even where that past experience is too of ten
f orgotten.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog,
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